EDITORIAL: Counting the cost of irrational foreign policy

Two high-level SA government delegations are abroad this week to try to contain self-inflicted damage caused by our erratic and thoughtless diplomacy. One, led by Sydney Mufamadi, President Cyril Ramaphosa’s national security adviser, is in Washington, and another, led by Pravin Gordhan, the public enterprises minister, is in Beijing.

Gordhan is meeting Chinese government officials to try to resolve a dispute that has seen Transnet, the state-owned freight logistics company, park more than 120 locomotives it bought from CRRC, a Chinese state-owned locomotives manufacturer. The trains are parked because Transnet, which cancelled the contract after it emerged that it was tainted by state capture corruption, cannot source parts from the Chinese.

After years of inept negotiations with CRRC officials, finally common sense prevailed. A month ago, Ramaphosa called in Transnet board members and executives and told them to address the inefficiencies that have cost SA’s miners billions in export revenues, and, as he should have done years ago, he instructed Gordhan to explore a government-to-government solution.

Though little information is known about the Mufamadi mission, it is widely believed that it forms part of damage control arising from the fallout of SA’s support for Russia which invaded Ukraine. Quite rightly, SA fears that its stance on Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine will cost it trade and investment opportunities with the West especially the US. Already there is talk that Washington is under pressure from its legislators to discontinue preferential trade access for SA’s exporters, especially vehicle manufacturers, to the US under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act. This generous unilateral trade regime is due for review in 2025.

In the past, the US has not hesitated to withdraw these trade benefits to punish governments for governance lapses. Cases in point are Ethiopia, Mali and Guinea.

SA’s business community is concerned at the growing irrationality of SA’s foreign policy. For example, why risk irritating Washington by siding with Russia? SA’s bilateral trade with Russia is a minuscule $2bn. America’s trade and investment support hundreds of thousands of SA jobs. These are now at risk for a country battling high unemployment, inequality and poverty.

Already, as a direct consequence of Pretoria’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, Ramaphosa has not been asked to attend this month’s crucial summit of leaders of the G7, the world’s richest nations. This deprives SA of a voice in the world’s most pressing issues of the day. 

Mufamadi, who from his days in Thabo Mbeki’s cabinet dabbled in foreign affairs, might succeed in defusing America’s anger at Pretoria. But his success could be sabotaged by more own goals by his government. Inexplicably, these past few days Pretoria abstained from a UN vote describing Russia as the aggressor in the war against Ukraine.

Similarly, Gordhan might secure a resolution to the CRRC-Transnet dispute. But this will not immediately resolve Transnet’s deep-seated operational and financial problems. Worse still, there is no guarantee that the government will not annoy the Chinese in the foreseeable future.

At the core of the problem lies lack of principle and national interest in the conduct of our foreign policy. Like Jacob Zuma before him, Ramaphosa puts the governing ANC before SA. As he is finding out, this comes at a cost.