DOUGLAS MASON: A free Ukraine is possible but will take years of war to get there

How does it end? That is the question Ukrainians and their Western backers privately ask about the war with Russia. There are no definitive answers. But it is possible to anticipate likely scenarios. The ideal one is that Russia either leaves or is expelled from occupied Ukrainian territory.

A year ago it was thought that Ukraine could regain the captured territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, threaten Crimea and the Donbas, and be in a strong position for eventual negotiations. The military balance does not favour that now.

Russia holds advantages in a longer war of attrition due to force of numbers, indifference to losses, and that it is moving its (far larger) economy to a war footing. The international environment is less favourable to Ukraine, with US military supplies held up by political deadlock. This would worsen were Donald Trump to be elected president in November, 10 months away. Worse scenarios would see Russia taking new territory.

What will determine the course of the war over 2024 and beyond is the relative balance of forces, including military industrial capacity. The realisation that it must take new measures to increase output and arm Ukraine to win indicates acceptance of this point by EU members in recent weeks.

Ukraine’s military position is holding despite ferocious Russian assaults, but it will need to wear down Russian forces and build up its own military to be in a position for a renewed offensive in 2025. Russian forces remain powerful and dangerous but have not demonstrated qualitative improvement, according to Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the US Army in Europe.

Russia’s willingness to absorb losses — about 1,000 of its soldiers are being killed or wounded each day — is intended to convey the message that Russia can sustain this indefinitely, but “actually demonstrates desperation”, he says. 

As long as the reasonable prospect of recovering its lost territory exists, Ukraine is entitled to pursue this. If indefinite stalemate or reversals beckon, alternatives need be considered. For negotiations to happen, both sides must be ready to accept that nothing more can be gained from battle, or that the cost will be unacceptable.

Neither side is there at this point. Ukraine wants to recover its captured territories. Its public also knows what a ghastly future awaits them under Russian occupation. Vladimir Putin has reiterated in recent weeks that he will continue the war until maximalist objectives — military conquest or subjugation — are achieved.

Negotiations at present would therefore be pointless, or involve terms that are unacceptable to the Ukrainian government and people — “de-Nazification”, extinguishing Ukraine’s democracy, imposition of an authoritarian pro-Russian government, and an end to the prospect of EU and Nato membership. Putin may never accept an independent Ukraine, or only after far more serious defeats and losses. He also cannot be trusted to stick to any deal — unless it is backed by force. 

If stalemate persists for another two or more years with no end in sight, what terms should Ukraine and Nato consider? Territorial concessions are taboo for the Western alliance, which has pledged to back Ukraine for “however long it takes”.

Privately, Western capitals are considering other scenarios. At some point, Ukraine itself must decide whether it can recover more territory, whether there are any better options, and whether it has had enough. Russia would also have to accept that its military adventure in Ukraine has run its course. It has sought to convey a sense of inevitability about its staying power, but that can be punctured by equal resolve.

An armistice rather than a peace treaty could follow. Fighting would stop and the front lines be frozen. Where they are depends on the course of battle until then as Ukraine fights it out. Russia would keep ill-gotten territorial gains, though Ukraine would not formally cede them. This would be analogous to how the war ended on the Korean peninsula in 1953. It would be a bitter pill for Ukraine to swallow, but at least bring war to an end. Those left under Russian occupation would be abandoned to a cruel fate. 

For fighting to end, credible security guarantees are needed for Ukraine, with or without Nato membership. A re-run of the failed Minsk peace agreements, where open-ended diplomatic negotiations took place while Putin preserved military options, is not something Ukraine or Nato should entertain.

Could Russia accept such guarantees? Yes. It would require the extension of a security umbrella over Ukraine backed by the will to uphold it. Russia would inevitably test Western resolve. A showdown could follow. Could the Western alliance be counted on not to blink, to go to the verge of war with Russia to uphold a principle? That would depend on who is exercising American leadership, Joe Biden or Donald Trump.

Absent American leadership, a “coalition of the willing” may yet emerge — Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Scandinavia and the Baltic states. Certain US military technology and capabilities are not substitutable, but there is enough to get the job done. For non-US Nato or the EU, this is a defining moment for what it is prepared to do independently to uphold European security without US military protection.

Russia’s current bid for regional domination, like the Soviet one during the Cold War, can be checked by Western resolve, according to academic Sergey Radchenko in his new book, To Run the World: The Kremlin’s Cold War Bid for Global Power. Behind the thirst for recognition and delusions of grandeur remain Russia’s perennial weaknesses and sense of inferiority. It can lose this war. 

It is therefore possible for there to be an exit from war that leaves Ukrainian sovereignty and its vibrant, open society intact. A settlement involving a peaceful, democratic Ukraine along the lines of West Germany during the Cold War, is not a terrible future. It would at least allow the country to get on with its destiny.

The example of a free and prosperous Ukraine is exactly what Putin does not want. That is all the more reason for Ukraine to define victory in those terms. However, to get there, years of war and painful suffering lie ahead for Ukrainians. 

• Mason, an associate of Johannesburg-based risk and resilience consultancy Eunomix, is on assignment in Ukraine.