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Chinese President Xi Jinping, front centre, is applauded as he arrives at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at The Great Hall of People in Beijing, China, October 16 2022. Picture: KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES
Chinese President Xi Jinping, front centre, is applauded as he arrives at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at The Great Hall of People in Beijing, China, October 16 2022. Picture: KEVIN FRAYER/GETTY IMAGES

In his first two terms as commander of the world’s largest military, Chinese President Xi Jinping has unleashed sweeping changes in its structure, posture and potency.

Over those 10 years, China rapidly expanded and advanced its naval and rocket forces, purged thousands of officers for corruption, reformed its command operations and built bases deep in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia.

Now come the tricky next steps for his central military commission: making sweeping changes in its leadership that commands China’s 2-million-strong People’s Liberation Army (PLA), potentially tightening Xi’s grip on the military and its modernisation.

On Sunday, China’s Communist Party opened its once-in-five-years congress, where it is expected to name replacements for four retirees among the six senior officers who serve under Xi on the commission. Among those expected to step down are its vice-chairmen, generals Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia, both 72. Zhang is seen widely as a close Xi ally.

Their replacements must integrate increasingly complex forces that would be vital for a Taiwan invasion, according to eight Asian and Western military attaches and seven security analysts, fulfilling Xi’s long-held demand for a  military than can “fight and win wars”.

Opening the meeting, Xi called for accelerating the building of a world-class military, saying China has to “be prepared for danger in times of peace”.

Diplomatic challenges are also mounting, as China’s military modernisation confronts traditional US strategic dominance in East Asia.

The military envoys and three of the analysts say the commission will need to secure foreign base and port access for its growing fleet as well as tackle possible external pressure to deepen international engagement on its nuclear arsenal. A slowing economy may also complicate modernisation.

Amid the challenges, most of the incoming generals probably lack one thing at least some of their predecessors had: combat experience.

Zhang and commission member Gen Li Zuocheng, who is also expected to retire, are among the last serving officers to have fought in the bloody border conflict with Vietnam that began with a troubled Chinese invasion in 1979 and rumbled on until the late 1980s.

Potential replacements include recent commanders from the reformed eastern and western theatre commands, responsible for Taiwan and the Indian border respectively, eight envoys say. Promotions could also come from the southern theatre command, home to vital naval bases.

Who is chosen could shed light on Xi’s military priorities. Operational choices are almost certain to be balanced by political commissar promotions, given their continued role to ensure that the military serves the Communist Party rather than the country.

There is no shortage of senior military officers who internally parrot Xi’s ‘fight and win’ mantra, but the conundrum for the PLA is the lack of operational experience.
Alexander Neill, military analyst

Operating out of an imposing and well-protected command building in western Beijing, the commission sits nominally under the party’s central committee but in practice works closely under the Politburo’s standing committee. Xi heads both bodies.

That overlap has led some analysts to caution against predictions of a Taiwan invasion based on any new commission line-up. The standing committee, not ambitious generals, would make such a momentous decision, they say.

“There is no shortage of senior military officers who internally parrot Xi’s ‘fight and win’ mantra, but the conundrum for the PLA is the lack of operational experience,” said Alexander Neill, a private military analyst.

James Char, a security scholar at Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said the PLA suffers from “shortcomings” in combined arms and joint operations. “Its capacity for sustained power projection also remains limited at present,” said Char.

China’s defence ministry did not respond to requests for comment.

The importance of absolute loyalty to Xi is crucial. Four diplomats scrutinising developments expect to see the continued rise of veteran commissar Adm Miao Hua, head of the commission’s political work department, to one of the vice-chair positions.

Miao, linked with Xi since they were posted in coastal Fujian province opposite Taiwan, will almost certainly be balanced by a more operational commander, possibly army Gen Liu Zhenli.

Two officers recently promoted to staff roles at the commission are also being watched, recent Eastern and Western commanders He Weidong and Xu Qiling. Xu Qiling has experience in Taiwan operations too.

The August drills around Taiwan after US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei showed the PLA still has only limited abilities to fully integrate its forces within and across commands — the “jointness” that Xi is eager to promote.

Senior Pentagon officials recently reiterated assessments that they did not think China would invade Taiwan in the next two years. US officials said privately they do not believe China will be militarily ready to fully take Taiwan by even 2027.

Nuclear forces

For some diplomats and scholars, the commission’s growing importance is highlighted by China’s nuclear forces, which Pentagon assessments say are expanding faster than expected.

During Xi’s next five-year term, China is expected to have up to 700 deliverable nuclear warheads, and 1,000 by 2030, according to the Pentagon’s latest annual report on China’s military modernisation.

More of those weapons are expected to be kept in advanced readiness in modernised silos. China now appears to operate a “nuclear triad”, capable of launching missiles from land, aircraft and submarines, the report says.

Christopher Twomey, a security scholar at the US Naval Postgraduate School in California, said it is important to resume international exchanges to understand Beijing’s evolving nuclear doctrine better, despite the growing role of habitually suspicious commissars on the commission.

“The new CMC will have an important voice on whether to engage the US on ensuring stability in the strategic nuclear arena,” Twomey said. “One suspects that leaders from the political side of the force would be most suspicious, whereas more international-minded officers might have some awareness of the dangers of spirals and inadvertent escalations.” 

Reuters

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