Russian president Vladimir Putin. Picture: KREMLIN VIA REUTERS/SPUTNIK/ALEXEI DRUZHININ
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The anniversary of the botched Soviet palace coup three decades ago, on August 19 1991, went by all but forgotten in Russia. However, despite this typical head-in-the-sand indifference, it was by all accounts a seismic historical event, its overall impact arguably equivalent to the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.

For Russia and the world the putsch changed history profoundly. It brought an end to 70 years of repressive Soviet Bolshevik rule; an end to the once mighty communist empire and party, Mikhail Gorbachev’s presidency, and the Cold War, and led to the emergence of a new democratic, free-market Russian Federation.

Why this apparent indifference? The answer could be that most Russians still feel ashamed, even humiliated, their national pride hurt by the helter-skelter way it happened and the dire, unpredictable consequences that followed in its wake.

A collective schizophrenic mentality also seems to prevail as most Russians seem quite happy to live with some of the profound changes that followed the coup. They, including the government of Vladimir Putin, don’t want to return to the Soviet system and values; they are enjoying the fruits of capitalism made possible by the coup.

According to recent surveys by the independent Russian Levada Centre, 66% of Russians believe neither the coup plotters, nor those who opposed them, were in the right. A 2020 poll by the same centre shows that only 20% actively want to return to the Soviet Union.

A major factor in Russian indifference, if not purposeful dementia, is the success of Putinism, which has compensated to an extent for the shame and embarrassment of the feeble collapse of the Soviet Union and decimation of Russian national pride and honour under former president Boris Yeltsin’s decade-long shambolic rule.

What many Russians still do not understand or accept is the inevitability of the Soviet implosion. They seem to ignore the fact that the USSR was already a spent force when Gorbachev took over, something he fully realised. He let the genie out of the bottle with his introduction of glasnost and perestroika (openness and restructuring) and his plan to introduce a New Union Treaty, a loose federation that would replace the USSR. Trying to stop the deluge, the KGB formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP in Russian), defining the country as “ungovernable”.

" In the end the democratic victory and new freedom from totalitarian oppression were simply wasted, giving away to former KGB apparatchiks. Yeltsin won the coup but lost the plot. "
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Gorbachev was arrested at his Black Sea dacha, but the coup leaders failed to take control. The GKChP consisted of a bunch of weak conservative leaders, some of them drunk at a TV press conference. Yet, unwilling to shed blood, soldiers refused orders to forcefully quell the resistance, leaving the door open for the wily and popular Boris Yeltsin to take control, and for the Soviet republics to declare their independence. Within three days the coup leaders had capitulated and were jailed.

The coup was a miserable failure on the part of the conservative rebels, leaving a long tail of consequences that were opposite to what had been intended, particularly the feeble demise of the Soviet Union and its Bolshevist ideology being consigned to the “dustbin of history”.

However, much of what was gained was lost in the decade of Yeltsin’s chaotic rule: particularly preventing democracy from taking root and making way for authoritarian Putinism. In the end the democratic victory and new freedom from totalitarian oppression were simply wasted, giving away to former KGB apparatchiks. Yeltsin won the coup but lost the plot.

As noted by Felix Light in the Moscow Times in August: “The post-collapse 1990s are seen (by most Russians) as a traumatic period of economic destitution, political turmoil and cultural upheaval, a repeat of which must be avoided at all costs.” In the end, it was clear that Russia was not ready for democracy, paving the way for Putin’s emergence as the “saviour of the Rodina”.

Seems irreplaceable

With a discredited Yeltsin gone in 2000, Putin, a former KGB apparatchik, and his siloviki (former KGB strongmen), took over as the ultimate winners. Much of the Soviet status quo ante was reintroduced, nullifying the democratic interlude. Totalitarianism, albeit sans the communist ideology, was progressively reintroduced in a reckless spurt of usurpation of power by the new Kremlin rulers. Ironically, after the trauma of the coup and a decade-long chaotic democratic interlude, modern Russia was simply claimed back through the GKChP putschists introducing a draconian security establishment, a veritable police state.

After 20 years firmly at the helm of Russian politics Putin seems irreplaceable. There is no plausible alternative as he keeps his options open to rule up to 2036 (his current presidential term ends in 2024). Russian Orthodox bishop Patriarch Kirill calls Putin a “miracle of God for Russia”, while the adoration expressed by Prof Alexander Dugin of Moscow State University is almost nauseating: “There are no more opponents to the Putin course, and if there are any they are ill and need psychiatric treatment. Putin is everything, Putin is absolute everywhere, and Putin is irreplaceable.” Most Russians seem to concur, as opinion polls have rated Putin’s popularity for most of his rule at 70%-80%.               

However, as even Putin should know, all good things seldom go together. With poll-boosting bold foreign adventures such as invading the Crimea, Eastern Ukraine and Georgia no longer in the offing, the popularity of the United Russia party, his main support base in the Russian duma, is in decline ahead of the upcoming September elections. In the wake of the devastating effects of Covid-19, a declining oil price, runaway corruption and cronyism, economic stagnation, biting Western sanctions and disaffected young citizens taking to the streets and internet, his leadership will be severely tested.

Colour revolution

If Putin leaves in 2024 his legacy could arguably emulate that of his hero, Peter the Great. However, should he choose to carry on until 2036 (as the new constitution makes possible) he may be presiding, as former Soviet Union president Leonid Brezhnev did, over an era of stagnation. At 69 years old, his ambition to rule until 2036 seems a bridge too far. 

Putin’s existential fear is that a “colour revolution” similar to those in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, might engulf Russia. Hence his obsession with security and his relentless suppression of opposition and democracy. Democrats such as Alexei Navalny, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Boris Nemtsov and many others have been ruthlessly eliminated. He has transformed Russia into a virtual police state, creating an environment in which sustained economic development and modernisation are hardly possible.

As Winston Churchill observed, Kremlin political intrigues are comparable to watching bulldogs fighting under a carpet. With this in mind, predictions are mere guesswork. However, what is no secret in Russian politics is that the Kremlin political elite are already fiercely competing (under the carpet) to replace Putin when the time comes. My guess is that he will step down before 2036, probably in 2024.

His successor is likely to continue with Putinism in one form or another.

• Olivier, a former SA ambassador in Russia and Kazakhstan, is extraordinary professor at Pretoria University.

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