CLAUDE JP DE BAISSAC: The political crisis that suddenly affects the country is not an accident

In 2018 Eunomix anticipated there was a 50% chance that Cyril Ramaphosa would be a one-term president. The reason was simple: unlike his predecessors, he had inherited a weak economy while having relatively weak political control over the ANC.

An analysis we conducted for a client showed that to either win a second term like Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma, or choose a successor like Nelson Mandela, the ANC president must benefit from a united party, even if the economy underperforms. The obverse is also true: even if the economy overperforms a president presiding over a divided ANC will lose. We now face a situation where the economy is underperforming and the president is extremely vulnerable.

Last week Ramaphosa was apparently convinced not to resign by his allies, indicating that he initially did not have the appetite for what promises to be a long, difficult and highly risky battle — for himself, the ANC and the country. Since then he has indicated that he will challenge the adverse findings of parliament’s Phala Phala panel. Ramaphosa has reached his Rubicon. Will he cross it?

The purpose of our analysis is not to predict an outcome, but to identify plausible scenarios and the risks each of them brings to the country. There are simply too many factors, too many dynamics and too many unknowns for anyone to accurately forecast what will happen. However, one over-riding conclusion stands: this political crisis is extremely serious, there are no easy or cost-free paths forward, and it significantly raises the likelihood of an economic crisis in the years ahead (by 2025).

The immediate issue Ramaphosa faces is the ANC’s “step aside” rule, adopted in 2021. It states that any member of the party must report that he/she is accused of or alleged to be involved in unethical or illegal activities. It also states that “[P]eople who fail to give an acceptable explanation or to voluntarily step down while they face disciplinary, investigative or prosecutorial procedures should be summarily suspended”, and that “ANC leaders and members who are alleged to be involved in corrupt activities should, where necessary, step aside until their names are cleared.” The member may of course refuse to comply with the rule, which will result in the ANC National Executive Committee’s 100 or so members voting on their suspension.

The ANC’s calendar upsets this process in this instance as the party is on the brink of a leadership election, with candidates for the top six positions having already been nominated by its branches. Here Ramaphosa has a substantial lead over his main rival, Zweli Mkhize, who was himself forced to “step aside”, resigning as health minister in 2021 over allegations of corruption. Unless Ramaphosa resigns the election will cut through the ANC disciplinary process. It is unlikely, though not impossible, that a disciplinary process will take place before the conference, which is set for December 16-20.

Assuming Ramaphosa does not voluntarily step aside, he still has to decide whether to accept the nomination, and if re-elected the position of president of the ANC. Before then a number of scenarios may play out. If he were to refuse the nomination it is highly unlikely that the party would allow a single candidate election for its presidency. But it is now too late — and there is no evidence that a process even exists — for branches to nominate someone else so close to conference. One or several new candidates would have to be proposed from the floor at the conference, voted on and then submitted for election. This would be a perilous process that would significantly raise political uncertainty and further divide the ANC.

If Ramaphosa were to stand, his candidacy may be challenged during the conference over, for instance, the step aside rule, also engendering significant contestation and internal strife. If he were to win re-election, court challenges should be expected. And we dare not underestimate the possibility of political violence, notably in KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, particularly if the branches supporting Mkhize feel the conference undermined their interests.  

If Ramaphosa were to either not stand or lose, key to the future of the ANC and the country would be who his successor is, and how he or she was selected and elected. Mkhize himself still faces the possibility of criminal charges and is thus as vulnerable as Ramaphosa. Given this mutual vulnerability, the ANC factions and branches (which overlap one another) may be forced to negotiate a solution that avoids “mutually-assured destruction”. Such horse-trading might allow the formation of a “balance of terror” slate, with the two tainted nominees cast aside for the sake of the ANC’s sacred unity (read: control of government). 

Were Ramaphosa to stand down or lose, the country would, for the third time in less than 15 years, face the likelihood of a president being “recalled” by the ANC. He would be likely to comply, and a new ANC president would be elected by a parliament that is still dominated by the ANC — assuming the party’s MPs can still stand in unity. Were Ramaphosa to reject the recall it would force the ANC to initiate impeachment proceedings (and, incidentally, an internal disciplinary process that would at that stage be moot). The ANC has enough votes to impeach, assuming once again that the party’s MPs can stand in unity.

Were Ramaphosa to win the ANC’s nomination, in addition to the likelihood of intraparty lawsuits and political violence, he would still have to confront the step aside rule — unless the rule is set aside or modified at the conference to accommodate his re-election and secure his position. Again, this would be highly risky politically and would certainly be contested. In this scenario there is a possibility that the NEC would be forced to convene a disciplinary hearing and vote on suspension.

If Ramaphosa is defeated at Nasrec he would have little choice but to resign the country’s presidency as he would face the prospect of the ANC parliamentary majority passing a motion of no confidence against him or impeaching him on the basis of the prime facie evidence from the Phala Phala panel investigation.

The constitution makes no provision for presidential immunity from charges of misconduct. However, it does provide clear rules for the impeachment of a sitting president, specifically for “serious violation of the constitution or the law, serious misconduct, or inability to perform the functions of office”. 

Should he manage to retain the presidency of the ANC, Ramaphosa still faces the prospect of impeachment in parliament. Unless he and his allies successfully demonstrate that the parliamentary investigation is flawed, procedurally and/or in the substance of its findings. A solid ANC conference victory for his faction would make this challenge winnable, with the ANC caucus aligning to reject the investigation and calling for a new one. This would gain Ramaphosa time, and perhaps even remove the threat entirely. A tight party leadership victory with a divided NEC would make such a challenge uncertain. Ramaphosa may still face impeachment or no-confidence, and not survive it if enough of ANC MPs were to vote with the opposition. 

Then there is the likelihood of a criminal investigation, which would be near impossible to stop given Ramaphosa’s past commitment to fight corruption, reinforce the National Prosecuting Authority and key organs of state, and respect the independence of the judiciary. Given the seriousness of parts of the panel’s prima facie case, one or more of the criminal justice system, SA Reserve Bank, SA Revenue Service or some other organ of the state is likely to find against him. Ramaphosa may also be subjected to additional criminal charges brought by individuals in opposing ANC factions or organisations such as opposition parties. He may also be sued in a civil court, where the threshold for culpability is lower than in a criminal court but where the political damage to him and the ANC could be just as severe.

Here lies the real challenge Ramaphosa and his allies face. Assuming they retain control of the party, are able to circumvent the step aside rule and succeed in their challenge to the parliamentary panel’s findings, they are still likely to face criminal or civil procedures that can only be resolved through either submitting to process until it is concluded, or undermining the process the same way Zuma and his allies have done. As the country knows all too well, the latter approach undermines the rule of law and accelerates the country’s descent into criminality and state failure.

Ramaphosa remains more popular than the ANC. This is his key card to play. He has signalled that we will resign rather than be forced out, but he has options that do not undermine the country’s rule of law and limit political risk and the unavoidable economic damage the Phala Phala crisis has already inflicted. It is possible that he will still beat the odds we calculated in 2018.

Perhaps the option least damaging to the country is that once re-elected he resigns both his positions as ANC president and country president in favour of a carefully chosen successor who carries on with the work he has begun. This would greatly elevate his stature, and also plausibly permit him to eventually return if cleared of wrongdoing. 

However, what is best for the country may not be best for the ANC. Ramaphosa is vastly more popular than his party. Should he sacrifice himself for the country his successor is highly likely to be less popular than he is (there are no ANC leaders that come anywhere close to his standing at present). This will significantly undermine the ANC’s already diminished chances of winning an outright majority in 2024.

There are no good scenarios for the ANC — only a range from less poor to very poor. Phala Phala and its consequences cannot be put back into a tidy box. Whatever happens — surrender or fight, lose or win, manage an exit or be exited — the ANC has once more taken the country to the brink. SA is in a fragile state, at increasing risk of political violence and serious economic crisis.

• De Baissac is CEO of global and country risk advisory firm Eunomix.