JUN KAJEE: Deepening ties with China puts GNU under pressure

SA’s fragile coalition government is at a crossroads as it grapples with a contentious foreign policy decision: the demand for Taiwan to relocate its unofficial embassy from Pretoria to Johannesburg.

This move reflects growing Chinese influence in SA and has sparked debate over the nation’s sovereignty. As the March 31 deadline for Taiwan’s office relocation approaches, SA finds itself under pressure to formulate a coherent policy position that would satisfy all parties to the government of national unity (GNU).

The 2024 elections marked a watershed moment in SA politics, ending the ANC’s decades-long dominance and ushering in a new era of coalition politics. The ANC, which has historically aligned itself with China, now faces mounting tension with its coalition partners over its pursuit of even-closer ties with Beijing. The demand for Taiwan to relocate its representative office is emblematic of these tensions, as it highlights broader disagreements within the coalition over foreign policy priorities.

The ANC’s decision aligns closely with China’s diplomatic strategy to isolate Taiwan on the global stage under the “One China” principle, which asserts that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. Critics argue that this move undermines SA’s political autonomy and reflects Beijing’s growing influence over the country’s foreign policy decisions.

SA’s relationship with Taiwan has undergone significant shifts over the decades. During the apartheid era, SA and Taiwan shared strong diplomatic ties, driven by their mutual international isolation. Taiwan provided political, economic and military support to SA’s white minority government and then, later, offered financial assistance to the ANC in its fight against apartheid. By 1995 Taiwan had become SA’s largest foreign investor and seventh-largest trading partner, demonstrating the mutual benefits of the partnership.

When Nelson Mandela assumed the presidency in 1994, he pioneered an unprecedented diplomatic approach by officially recognising both Taiwan and China. This “dual recognition” strategy allowed SA to maintain ties with both governments — a unique arrangement in international diplomacy. However, geopolitical pressures soon forced Mandela’s hand. In 1998 SA officially recognised the People’s Republic of China and severed formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan after Beijing threatened to restrict access to Hong Kong’s markets and airspace.

The parallels between the events of 1998 and today are striking. In both cases, Beijing leveraged economic pressure to dictate SA’s foreign policy decisions. The current demand for Taiwan to relocate its representative office coincides with heightened Sino-SA relations following President Cyril Ramaphosa’s state visit to China in September 2024. During this visit, Ramaphosa elevated bilateral ties to an “all-round strategic co-operative partnership”, signing agreements to boost infrastructure projects, address SA’s energy crisis and expand agricultural exports.

While closer ties with China offer potential economic benefits, they also carry significant risks for SA’s already struggling economy. Critics warn that aligning too closely with Beijing could jeopardise trade relationships with key Western partners, including those under the African Growth & Opportunity Act (Agoa). The US has expressed concern over SA’s foreign policy direction, particularly its perceived alignment with China and Russia.

The Trump administration has responded swiftly to these developments by imposing sanctions on SA, including freezing $440m in aid and halting the US President’s Programme for Aids Relief (Pepfar) funding for HIV/Aids programmes. Secretary of state Marco Rubio recently boycotted the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting in Johannesburg, citing Ramaphosa’s “anti-American” policies. These actions underscore the potential economic fallout from SA’s deepening alignment with China at the expense of its relationships with Western allies. 

Domestically, SA faces additional economic challenges that complicate its ability to navigate these international pressures. Despite modest growth projections for 2025, unemployment remains alarmingly high at 31.9%, worsening inequality and social unrest.

Critics argue that China’s growing influence undermines SA’s sovereignty and its ability to pursue an independent foreign policy aligned with democratic values. Beijing’s significant investments in SA state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have raised alarms about potential influence over government decisions. As China continues to expand its role as Africa’s largest trading partner, concerns persist about how these economic ties might affect SA’s policy-making processes.

Ramaphosa has faced scrutiny for his shifting allegiances between China and Western nations. Once hailed as a reformer within the ANC, Ramaphosa built his fortune through partnerships with US companies but has increasingly cultivated ties with China in recent years. While he praises China’s Belt & Road Initiative as a catalyst for African development, he has adopted a confrontational stance toward Western criticism of his policies — particularly from the US.

Ramaphosa’s approach mirrors that of leaders such as Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, who have benefited from Western economic systems while openly contradicting Western values. This duality raises questions about whether Ramaphosa can balance competing interests without compromising SA’s sovereignty or alienating key international partners.

The ANC does not speak for all members of SA’s coalition government when it comes to foreign policy decisions involving Taiwan and China. Several parties within the GNU have voiced strong opposition to the ANC’s actions:

• The IFP has long been a supporter of Taiwan due to significant Taiwanese investments in KwaZulu-Natal during apartheid that provided employment for thousands of black South Africans. The party views Taiwan as a valuable ally and opposes efforts to diminish its presence in Pretoria.
• Led by Pieter Groenewald, the Freedom Front Plus (FF+) warns that relocating Taiwan’s office could harm trade relations between SA and Taiwan while benefiting Chinese interests at SA’s expense. 
• Under John Steenhuisen’s leadership, the DA emphasises maintaining SA’s sovereignty and democratic values while criticising China’s human rights record and influence over ANC decisions. 

These parties collectively advocate for a foreign policy that prioritises continued relations with Taiwan as opposed to a deepening of ties with Beijing — a stance that contrasts sharply with the ANC’s position.

As tension within the GNU escalates, there are growing concerns about whether this fragile coalition can survive much longer. The ANC’s unilateral approach to foreign policy has alienated its partners within the coalition while drawing criticism from international allies such as the US.

Polling data indicates declining support for the ANC nationally — down to just 32% — raising the fear of further fragmentation within the party itself. If the coalition collapses entirely, it would trigger enormous upheaval in SA politics at a time when stability is desperately needed to address pressing domestic challenges such as unemployment and inequality.

The coming weeks will be crucial in determining whether SA can weather this storm or is headed for a new era of political uncertainty dominated by Chinese influence. As the deadline for Taiwan’s office relocation approaches, the GNU must reconcile divergent policy positions among its members or risk disintegration.

SA stands at a critical juncture where decisions made today will shape its future trajectory both domestically and internationally. Whether it chooses closer alignment with Beijing or prioritises relationships with democratic nations remains uncertain — but what is clear is that these choices will have lasting implications for SA’s sovereignty and global standing.

• Kajee is a lecturer and adjunct faculty member at Ling Tung University in Taiwan, focusing on internationalisation and intercultural communication.