NICHOLAS SHUBITZ: Turkey’s Syria gamble has no obvious payoff
Ankara may eventually join the Brics nations, but in the interim it needs to maintain a balanced approach
03 March 2025 - 13:25
byNicholas Shubitz
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Turkey's President Tayyip Erdogan. Picture: PRESIDENTIAL PRESS OFFICE
Like the whirling dervishes, whose mesmerising dance demands extraordinary balance, Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy stance relies on a carefully calibrated equilibrium. As internal divisions consume Nato, Turkey has expressed interest in joining the Brics bloc. Will Ankara maintain its centre of gravity or tilt decisively in one direction?
From brokering trade deals in Africa to engaging in regional conflicts, Turkey has established itself as a major player in global affairs. However, beneath these successes lies a nation grappling with mass migration and high inflation. After years of EU rejection, and with Nato divisions emerging over Ukraine, Brics membership has become an appealing proposition.
Turkey’s mediation in the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia already highlights its growing influence among emerging markets. The conflict was sparked by Ethiopia’s plan to construct a port in Somaliland, a breakaway state that Somalia still considers part of its territory.
The Turkish-brokered agreement seeks Ethiopia’s access to the sea via Somalia instead, skilfully defusing tension and bolstering Ankara’s reputation as a peacemaker in Africa.
Turkey has been steadily expanding its footprint across the continent, delivering Bayraktar drones to nations such as Niger, Mali and Chad, while investing in infrastructure, education and agriculture. These efforts are complemented by agreements on oil and gas exploration, reflecting Ankara’s efforts to diversify its energy sources and project influence beyond its borders.
Energy security remains a cornerstone of Turkey’s geopolitical strategy. As the last remaining conduit for pipeline natural gas from Russia to Eastern Europe, Turkey’s exploration of offshore oil blocks in Somalia aligns with its ambitions to gain control of critical energy corridors. Similarly, the vast gas reserves of the eastern Mediterranean are of particular interest to the nation.
However, these aspirations have strained relations with its Western partners. Turkey’s unilateral actions in the contested waters of the eastern Mediterranean have undermined its relationships with Greece and Cyprus, jeopardising Turkey’s already fragile political ties with the EU. Similarly, Ankara’s long-standing conflict with the Kurds has complicated its ties with the US.
Ankara views the US-backed Kurdish groups in Syria as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated a terrorist organisation in Turkey. Though the PKK recently proposed a ceasefire deal in exchange for the release of its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has warned that Turkey would keep an “iron fist ready in case the hand we extend is left in the air or bitten”.
The Kurdish issue has increased tension with Washington, which armed the Kurds to secure access to Syria’s oil resources. Following reports that US troops may soon be leaving Syria, the PKK has called for negotiations instead of conflict. This suggests the Kurdish threat was predicated on US power, giving credence to Turkey’s dissatisfaction with its Nato ally.
Relations with the US have also come under increased scrutiny due to Ankara’s alignment with the Brics. While Nato membership ostensibly provides Turkey with US security guarantees, its deepening ties with Russia, exemplified by its purchase of Russian S-400 missile defence systems, have caused further frictions within an increasingly strained alliance.
Balancing these roles is no easy task. While Brics offers Turkey the opportunity to bolster its struggling economy and reduce inflation through increased domestic currency trade, the EU remains Turkey’s largest trade partner. Tensions within Nato further complicate matters, and Erdogan’s ambiguous approach risks isolating both groupings.
Erdogan’s vision of Turkey as a modern heir to the Ottoman Empire shapes much of his foreign policy. By projecting strength and influence outside the country, he seeks to restore Turkey’s historic role as a regional power. However, this vision is not without its critics.
Trump’s newly appointed director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, has accused Turkey of funding jihadist groups in Syria, raising concerns about Ankara’s role in destabilising the country. These allegations complicate Turkey’s relations with both the US and Russia, which maintains a key naval base in Tartus on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.
Russia, a critical partner in energy and regional security, opposed Turkey’s role in overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the US remains wary of Turkey’s support for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Alienating both powers could leave Turkey isolated, especially with Moscow and Washington working to restore ties with each other.
It is also unclear how Turkey’s moves in Syria help resolve its domestic economic struggles. High inflation, a devalued lira and high expanded unemployment numbers have eroded public trust in Erdogan’s economic management. Yet, despite these challenges, Erdogan still prioritises grand external projects to bolster national pride and distract from problems at home.
Erdogan’s domestic political challenges have grown since his post-2016 coup crackdown, and it remains unclear whether there is widespread popular support for his expansionist foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, Erdogan has expressed a desire to send 1-million Syrian immigrants back to Syria, which could please an electorate dissatisfied with their presence in Turkey.
Moscow has not publicly criticised Ankara for breaking its trilateral agreement with Iran to allow Assad to stay in power, and the US has shown a willingness to negotiate with the new Turkish-backed government in Syria, quickly removing its new head, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, aka Julani, from its terrorist list. However, any further destabilisation could harm Turkish relations with other regional players.
Israel should brace for a potential clash with Turkey over Ankara’s support for various factions in Syria, a major government-backed panel has warned. The report from the Nagel commission, led and named after a former national security adviser to Benjamin Netanyahu, highlighted what it sees as Ankara’s ambitions to restore Ottoman-era influence in the Middle East, warning that Turkish-backed groups in Syria could prove more dangerous to Israeli security than Iran.
Turkey’s emergence as an influential player is undeniable. Its diplomatic successes, energy corridor ambitions and military assertiveness have elevated its status on the global stage. As the conflict between the US and EU over Nato’s involvement in Ukraine intensifies, Turkey could end up shifting towards the Brics. In the meantime, maintaining a balanced approach will be a critical test for Ankara.
Support our award-winning journalism. The Premium package (digital only) is R30 for the first month and thereafter you pay R129 p/m now ad-free for all subscribers.
NICHOLAS SHUBITZ: Turkey’s Syria gamble has no obvious payoff
Ankara may eventually join the Brics nations, but in the interim it needs to maintain a balanced approach
Like the whirling dervishes, whose mesmerising dance demands extraordinary balance, Turkey’s ambitious foreign policy stance relies on a carefully calibrated equilibrium. As internal divisions consume Nato, Turkey has expressed interest in joining the Brics bloc. Will Ankara maintain its centre of gravity or tilt decisively in one direction?
From brokering trade deals in Africa to engaging in regional conflicts, Turkey has established itself as a major player in global affairs. However, beneath these successes lies a nation grappling with mass migration and high inflation. After years of EU rejection, and with Nato divisions emerging over Ukraine, Brics membership has become an appealing proposition.
Turkey’s mediation in the dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia already highlights its growing influence among emerging markets. The conflict was sparked by Ethiopia’s plan to construct a port in Somaliland, a breakaway state that Somalia still considers part of its territory.
The Turkish-brokered agreement seeks Ethiopia’s access to the sea via Somalia instead, skilfully defusing tension and bolstering Ankara’s reputation as a peacemaker in Africa.
Turkey has been steadily expanding its footprint across the continent, delivering Bayraktar drones to nations such as Niger, Mali and Chad, while investing in infrastructure, education and agriculture. These efforts are complemented by agreements on oil and gas exploration, reflecting Ankara’s efforts to diversify its energy sources and project influence beyond its borders.
Energy security remains a cornerstone of Turkey’s geopolitical strategy. As the last remaining conduit for pipeline natural gas from Russia to Eastern Europe, Turkey’s exploration of offshore oil blocks in Somalia aligns with its ambitions to gain control of critical energy corridors. Similarly, the vast gas reserves of the eastern Mediterranean are of particular interest to the nation.
However, these aspirations have strained relations with its Western partners. Turkey’s unilateral actions in the contested waters of the eastern Mediterranean have undermined its relationships with Greece and Cyprus, jeopardising Turkey’s already fragile political ties with the EU. Similarly, Ankara’s long-standing conflict with the Kurds has complicated its ties with the US.
Ankara views the US-backed Kurdish groups in Syria as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated a terrorist organisation in Turkey. Though the PKK recently proposed a ceasefire deal in exchange for the release of its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has warned that Turkey would keep an “iron fist ready in case the hand we extend is left in the air or bitten”.
The Kurdish issue has increased tension with Washington, which armed the Kurds to secure access to Syria’s oil resources. Following reports that US troops may soon be leaving Syria, the PKK has called for negotiations instead of conflict. This suggests the Kurdish threat was predicated on US power, giving credence to Turkey’s dissatisfaction with its Nato ally.
Relations with the US have also come under increased scrutiny due to Ankara’s alignment with the Brics. While Nato membership ostensibly provides Turkey with US security guarantees, its deepening ties with Russia, exemplified by its purchase of Russian S-400 missile defence systems, have caused further frictions within an increasingly strained alliance.
Balancing these roles is no easy task. While Brics offers Turkey the opportunity to bolster its struggling economy and reduce inflation through increased domestic currency trade, the EU remains Turkey’s largest trade partner. Tensions within Nato further complicate matters, and Erdogan’s ambiguous approach risks isolating both groupings.
Erdogan’s vision of Turkey as a modern heir to the Ottoman Empire shapes much of his foreign policy. By projecting strength and influence outside the country, he seeks to restore Turkey’s historic role as a regional power. However, this vision is not without its critics.
Trump’s newly appointed director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, has accused Turkey of funding jihadist groups in Syria, raising concerns about Ankara’s role in destabilising the country. These allegations complicate Turkey’s relations with both the US and Russia, which maintains a key naval base in Tartus on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.
Russia, a critical partner in energy and regional security, opposed Turkey’s role in overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. Meanwhile, the US remains wary of Turkey’s support for groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Alienating both powers could leave Turkey isolated, especially with Moscow and Washington working to restore ties with each other.
It is also unclear how Turkey’s moves in Syria help resolve its domestic economic struggles. High inflation, a devalued lira and high expanded unemployment numbers have eroded public trust in Erdogan’s economic management. Yet, despite these challenges, Erdogan still prioritises grand external projects to bolster national pride and distract from problems at home.
Erdogan’s domestic political challenges have grown since his post-2016 coup crackdown, and it remains unclear whether there is widespread popular support for his expansionist foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, Erdogan has expressed a desire to send 1-million Syrian immigrants back to Syria, which could please an electorate dissatisfied with their presence in Turkey.
Moscow has not publicly criticised Ankara for breaking its trilateral agreement with Iran to allow Assad to stay in power, and the US has shown a willingness to negotiate with the new Turkish-backed government in Syria, quickly removing its new head, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa, aka Julani, from its terrorist list. However, any further destabilisation could harm Turkish relations with other regional players.
Israel should brace for a potential clash with Turkey over Ankara’s support for various factions in Syria, a major government-backed panel has warned. The report from the Nagel commission, led and named after a former national security adviser to Benjamin Netanyahu, highlighted what it sees as Ankara’s ambitions to restore Ottoman-era influence in the Middle East, warning that Turkish-backed groups in Syria could prove more dangerous to Israeli security than Iran.
Turkey’s emergence as an influential player is undeniable. Its diplomatic successes, energy corridor ambitions and military assertiveness have elevated its status on the global stage. As the conflict between the US and EU over Nato’s involvement in Ukraine intensifies, Turkey could end up shifting towards the Brics. In the meantime, maintaining a balanced approach will be a critical test for Ankara.
• Shubitz is an independent Brics analyst.
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