THANDO MZIMELA-NTULI: Pretoria and the Paul Kagame problem

SA’s relationship with Rwanda, and by extension President Paul Kagame, is a political science case study of the times. It is shaped by the political instincts of the two countries’ presidents and the shifting tides of continental diplomacy in the region. However, at its core the relationship has been defined and largely characterised by a push-and-pull dynamic between ideals and realpolitik, with each SA head of state bringing a different vision for Africa, and consequently, a different posture towards Kigali.

Kagame, who is widely regarded across the continent as a political chess master in his own right, has played to his strengths — engaging SA when it suits his interests and defying it when necessary. The question, then, is not whether SA’s presidents have influenced Kagame, but rather how Kagame has shaped their presidencies and SA’s standing on the continent.

Mandela — the peacemaker with limits

The context is this: President Nelson Mandela inherited a country eager to assert its moral authority in international affairs, positioning itself as the continent’s symbol of peace and reconciliation. The foreign policies of his tenure emphasised mediation, conflict resolution and African solidarity. But even Mandela’s statesmanship had limits when it came to Rwanda. His idealism was confronted by the reality of power politics — Mandela sought peace through consensus, whereas Kagame sought power through control.

The genocide of 1994 unfolded in the same year as SA’s democratic transition, and Mandela’s presidency — focused on domestic consolidation — offered little in the way of direct intervention. Still, SA was a vocal advocate for post-genocide reconstruction, favouring a diplomatic approach that prioritised reconciliation over punitive justice. Kagame, consolidating power after the genocide, was sceptical of SA’s moralistic approach, which lacked the strategic engagement he preferred.

While Mandela’s SA sought peace through dialogue, Kagame was already demonstrating that his survival — and that of his government — would be dictated on his terms. Their relationship, while cordial, lacked depth; Mandela’s SA was not ready to engage Rwanda’s complexities beyond the symbolic. Simply put, Mandela’s peace-building ethos was too optimistic for a leader like Kagame, who knew the game was about more than just ideals.

Mbeki — the ideologue and the African renaissance gambit

If Mandela was the diplomat, Thabo Mbeki was the architect, seeking to construct a new continental order where Africa would solve its own problems. Under his African renaissance vision SA would lead the continent’s economic and political integration through the AU and Nepad. But Rwanda, under Kagame, did not fit neatly into Mbeki’s framework. Kagame’s governance model was based on authoritarian efficiency rather than Mbeki’s vision of democracy and pan-African consensus-building.

Where Mbeki and Kagame found common ground was in their rejection of Western paternalism. Both leaders were vocal about Africa’s need to chart its own course. But their divergence became clear when Mbeki increasingly saw Kagame’s involvement in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as undermining African unity. SA sought continental stability through institutions, whereas Kagame saw state power as a tool for security and expansion. SA played mediator in the Great Lakes region, but Kagame viewed Pretoria’s diplomacy as naïve. Mbeki, for all his diplomatic brilliance, was uncomfortable with Kagame’s naked ambition.

Zuma — when diplomacy turns hostile

Jacob Zuma’s presidency marked a turning point as tensions between SA and Rwanda escalated from quiet unease to outright hostility. Zuma’s government, more transactional and security-orientated, was confronted with Kagame’s aggressive regional manoeuvres, particularly in DRC. But the breaking point came with the assassinations of Rwandan dissidents on SA soil.

The murder of Rwanda’s former head of external intelligence, Patrick Karegeya, in Johannesburg in 2014, followed by the attempted assassination of exiled Rwandan general Kayumba Nyamwasa, was widely believed to be linked to Kagame’s government. Kagame’s response to Karegeya’s murder was telling: “Rwanda did not kill this person — and it’s a big ‘no’,” he stated. “But I add that I actually wish Rwanda did it. I really wish it.”

Under Zuma, SA took the unprecedented step of expelling Rwandan diplomats and publicly condemning Kagame’s interference. Kigali responded with defiance, signalling that Rwanda was no longer intimidated by SA’s influence. Meanwhile, Zuma took a more aggressive stance in DRC, supporting military action against M23, a rebel group with ties to Rwanda. SA’s intervention, alongside the UN Force Intervention Brigade, significantly weakened M23, demonstrating Pretoria’s capacity for force projection when necessary. However, this came at the cost of SA’s relationship with Kagame, which entered a deep freeze.

Zuma’s administration brought regional security issues involving Rwanda into sharp relief, but at the cost of SA’s diplomatic credibility. Where Mandela sought dialogue and Mbeki sought consensus, Zuma was prepared to wield force. This stark shift showed how SA’s diplomatic strategy was evolving — from one of persuasion to one of pragmatic interventionism.

Ramaphosa — a retreat from continental leadership

Where Zuma’s SA was assertive, Cyril Ramaphosa’s presidency has been defined by caution. Ramaphosa inherited an SA in economic decline, with its foreign policy increasingly constrained by domestic imperatives. Unlike his predecessors, he has not sought to project SA’s influence forcefully on the continent. His approach to Kagame has been one of quiet diplomacy, largely avoiding direct confrontation despite lingering tensions.

This passivity has coincided with Rwanda’s rising influence in Africa. Kagame has cultivated deeper ties with global powers, secured leadership positions within the AU, and repositioned Rwanda as a key player in peacekeeping and regional stability. SA, once the dominant power on the continent, has watched as Kagame’s Rwanda punches above its weight. In the latest DRC crisis Ramaphosa has leant on regional mechanisms such as the Southern African Development Community (Sadc), in contrast to Zuma’s more direct interventionism.

Kagame as a mirror for SA’s foreign policy

The shifting relationship between SA and Rwanda is not just about personalities — reflects more than just bilateral tensions. It is a measure of SA’s evolving role on the continent. Under Mandela SA was the moral compass. Under Mbeki, it was the ideological architect. Under Zuma, it was the reluctant enforcer. Under Ramaphosa, it is an observer.

In contrast, Kagame’s Rwanda has followed a linear trajectory — pragmatic, security-focused and increasingly influential, while maintaining its regional integrity in so far as the West is concerned. Kagame’s model is one of state-driven efficiency and hard power. SA’s model — when it had one — was based on institutional diplomacy and multilateralism. Today, Kagame’s vision seems to be winning.

As SA retreats from continental leadership, Rwanda’s influence continues to grow. If SA wants to reclaim its status as Africa’s leading voice it must learn from its past engagements with Kagame. The lesson is not to mimic Rwanda’s hard-nosed approach, but to recognise that continental leadership requires more than rhetoric. It requires strategic clarity, decisive action and a willingness to engage power as it is — not as one wishes it to be.

• Mzimela-Ntuli is group president of youth-led NPO the National Executive Economic Council.