HELMOED RÖMER HEITMAN: What SA learnt a decade after Bangui — and unlearnt again

In March 2013 a small SA force of about 200 soldiers found itself engaged by several thousand well-armed rebels attacking Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic (CAR). The force did astonishingly well against those odds, so much so that the rebels proposed a ceasefire after taking heavy losses. But it cost the country 15 soldiers killed and 25 wounded. Ten years later it is worth considering what went right and what went wrong.

What went right? First, there were sound policy and strategic reasons for deploying the protection force to Bangui instead of simply withdrawing the training team. SA wanted to play a regional role and could not afford to be seen to run away at the first sign of trouble. In addition, the CAR has a 1,550km river border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), a fellow Southern African Development Community (Sadc) state that is itself fragile. That border provides access for guerrillas and terrorists to much of the DRC river network, and airfields near the border lend themselves to logistical support for rebels.

Second, once the decision had been taken, the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) proved capable of prompt and swift action, albeit hampered by a lack of air transport. The request for support was received on December 29, the president was briefed the next day. The defence minister flew to Bangui on December 31 to sign a revised status of forces agreement and the protection force had been deployed by January 4.

When things turned bad, the response was quick. A special forces group, two Rooivalk attack helicopters and three Oryx transport helicopters were deployed to Gemena across the river from Bangui, a paratrooper combat team was deployed to Entebbe ready to fly into Bangui, and four Gripens flew to Kinshasa ready to provide air support.

Third, the protection force fought exceedingly well. No other force could have done better; many would not have done as well. And fourth, when the Central African heads of state chose to “give Séléka a chance”, rather than enforce the Libreville Accord, we terminated our engagement as there was clearly no longer any point in it.

What went wrong? First, we made unsound assumptions: that the Séléka (an alliance of rebel groups) would abide by the Libreville Accord. Guerrillas and terrorists rarely abide by agreements, and Séléka proved no different. We also believed that the peacekeeping force deployed by the Central African Community would fight if necessary. Its commander talked the talk, and they were well armed, but when Séléka attacked they stepped aside. Both were partly a result of the failure of SA’s department of international relations & co-operation and the then SA Secret Service to provide pertinent insights.

Second, we deployed a force that was too small and lightly armed for the mission: a paratroop combat team, a special forces group and tactical intelligence teams for a mission that called for an infantry battalion, preferably with attached armoured cars. A full battalion could have blocked both main access routes, with a company in reserve to deal with attempts to infiltrate on foot. The proof is the paratroop combat team holding north of Bangui for a whole day, with the special forces group chasing Séléka several kilometres back up the road.

They had to withdraw only when Séléka was able to advance along the western route behind them when the CAR army unit failed to hold the Mpoko River bridge. Then there was not enough time for the special forces group to block the crossing, and lacking armoured vehicles they did not have the combat power to push Séléka back. The deployed force was arguably adequate for the situation in January, but we should have picked up the change in Séléka from ragtag rebels to a more disciplined and well-armed force by March.

Third, we did not give the force commander key assets upon his request:

• Air reconnaissance. Even just one aircraft with an optronic turret would have given warning and allowed a request for deployment of the reserve or withdrawal to the airport;
• Armoured personnel carriers could have avoided most or even all fatal casualties. Faster than the Geckos used by the paratroopers, they would have allowed them to pass the Y-junction before Séléka massed there, avoiding the clash that brought the fatal casualties, or they could have crashed through with three or four casualties if an RPG had hit one of the personnel carriers; and
• Air support. A flight of Rooivalk attack helicopters would have entirely changed things.

Fourth, warnings that Séléka had breached the ceasefire and would attack were received but reached neither the force commander nor the officer co-ordinating things in Pretoria, with the result that the protection force was caught by surprise and the reserve could be deployed only after the initial battle was over.

There were other missteps. We deployed an ad hoc force under an ad hoc command structure. It worked well only because the paratroops and special forces know each other and because the force commander had the competence and character to pull them together. Worse, we did not enforce a single line of command, which allowed the officer heading the training team to make a nuisance of himself, though members of the team proved better. And logistical support was less than ideal. Then there was a problem organising a chartered airlift to deploy the reserve force, aircraft already en route to SA being stopped, and another company being contracted that could not respond in time.

Back to what worked: the experience of Bangui led to the decision to include troops with Bangui experience in the next contingents to deploy to the DRC, and that experience was built into the pre-mission training. It also led to a decision that we would not again deploy without air support, hence Rooivalk in the DRC. Sadly, underfunding has undone that, and the contingent now in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique, does not have Rooivalk support, lacks air reconnaissance and lacks sufficient transport helicopters to be effective.

Lessons learnt, and perforce unlearnt.

• Heitman is an independent security and defence analyst.