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The fate of Ukraine after Russia’s invasion has provoked strong reaction among those who identify a totemic struggle to extend political and economic governance along Western lines. The emerging Russian-Chinese authoritarian alliance and its well-wishers represent a direct challenge to Western norms. So where does SA stand on this invasion? The ANC is divided and ambivalent about its Western democratic legacy of constitutional government. Despite facing the consequences of mounting scandal and the temptations of illiberal rule, it is not ready to slam the door on it either. Illustration: KAREN MOOLMAN
The fate of Ukraine after Russia’s invasion has provoked strong reaction among those who identify a totemic struggle to extend political and economic governance along Western lines. The emerging Russian-Chinese authoritarian alliance and its well-wishers represent a direct challenge to Western norms. So where does SA stand on this invasion? The ANC is divided and ambivalent about its Western democratic legacy of constitutional government. Despite facing the consequences of mounting scandal and the temptations of illiberal rule, it is not ready to slam the door on it either. Illustration: KAREN MOOLMAN

The fate of Ukraine after Russia’s invasion has provoked strong reaction among those who identify a totemic struggle to extend political and economic governance along Western lines, as an open society with a market economy, transparency and democratic accountability from its elites.

This matters beyond Ukraine. These are systemic markers for the Global South, whose future governance is up for grabs. These countries have wide variation along a democratic to authoritarian axis, and progress towards a democratic standard is no longer inevitable or even desirable as a societal and elite consensus. The emerging Russian-Chinese authoritarian alliance and its well-wishers represent a direct challenge to Western norms.

For Ukrainians, the outcome of the war involves what future they choose for themselves. Since independence in 1991 the country has struggled with governance and developed the features of an inefficient, corrupt, oligarchic state. Continuation of this model, under which re-election of the incumbent or an associate is never in doubt, is what Vladimir Putin has offered. Ukraine was on track to be a “controlled democracy”.

Twice, Ukrainians have risen up to reject this. Given the choice between the freedoms and prosperity of open societies they see having taken root in their erstwhile Warsaw Pact neighbours that are now part of the EU, versus authoritarianism, they have chosen the former.

Since the 2004 Orange Revolution and 2013-14 Euro-Maidan protests, Ukraine has moved slowly but unevenly towards Western democratic standards. Problems of corruption and weak independent institutions persist, but the country has seen competitive elections and regular changes of power, the ultimate test of democratic authenticity.

Should the Euro-Maidan protests have been successfully suppressed, pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovich and his cronies would be in power now, with captured institutions and a cowed civil society. Ukraine would be tracking the same trajectory as Belarus and Russia as an authoritarian state. Political parties would be vehicles for insiders, elections providing an appearance of choice, charades that the population must pretend to think are real. The real opposition would be harassed and driven underground.

Ukraine persisting as an independent state will enable movement towards Western democratic governance, and ultimately EU membership. The outcome will be a strong vindication of Ukrainian sovereignty but also a signal for the character of democracy and economic governance in countries far beyond.

Transparency and strong independent institutions are foundational for economic and political development and growth economics along democratic Western lines. But they are inimical to elite interests in states with weak oversight by civil society or accompanying institutional checks and balances.

Negative phenomena in the political economy mean that in many developing countries property rights, equitable application of the law and competitive markets, as well as respect for human rights and political fair play, are counter to elite self-interest and behaviour. Elites instead thrive on irregular influence, rent-seeking and institutional override.

Western norms of good governance are a precondition for international co-operation and investment. These are difficult to meet and can even be politically destabilising. Little wonder then that so many developing countries have embraced China and Russia’s no-strings-attached approach to international co-operation.

China’s rise as a source of finance for public infrastructure and private investment mostly sees independent oversight, checks and balances bypassed. Moreover, their untransparent nature provides direct personal benefit to elite players. The extra costs are born by the country’s debt profile, business ethics and political culture.

The effect of these choices across a range of countries reaches far beyond Ukraine — it is the question for many other countries regarding open democratic government versus closed and unaccountable governance.

Where does SA fit in? The ANC is divided and ambivalent about its Western democratic legacy of constitutional government. But despite facing the consequences of mounting scandal and the temptations of illiberal rule, it is not ready to slam the door on it either. The radical economic transformation faction coming to power would settle the question more decisively. This would be the answer to their dreams — judicial and institutional independence would end; elite impunity would be supreme.

A country can still get rich with authoritarian governance, as China shows. But SA is no China. The ANC is not able to discipline excessive rent-seeking by its own members. The problem, as in much of Africa, is elite enrichment going too far and preventing wealth creation altogether. China’s authorities are not wholly happy with the ANC as a partner. The short-term gains of looting a state through a local associate decline if that partner cannot ensure order and economic growth. China does not need another Zimbabwe.

Otherwise, the ANC muddles along as a laggard in democratic governance but not giving up on it either. Its ideological and historical baggage mean it remains connected to Putin’s Russia as an ally. The party is now openly reactionary — it fears people power from below and even uses the terminology of Ukraine’s recent history to equate opposition to its own, injurious, rule to the Colour revolutions of Eastern Europe, democratic uprisings that it terms counter-revolutionary. The people of Ukraine, having experienced centuries of Russian colonialism and now invasion, are an embarrassing fact to be avoided as the party reserves its outrage for American imperialism.

The long-term strategies both of the West and civil society and opposition parties inside SA must be to create democratic space and build coalitions that favour openness. This also requires setting out and winning a battle of ideas for accountable governance in the Global South. The alternative is to allow predatory elites to entrench themselves and find assistance from like-minded international partners.

• Mason, an associate of Johannesburg-based risk and resilience consultancy Eunomix, is on extended assignment in Ukraine.

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