RONAK GOPALDAS AND MENZI NDHLOVU: What happens next in SA-US relations?

SA ambassador Ebrahim Rasool’s expulsion from the US has plunged the country into a fresh diplomatic crisis, worsening already strained relations with the US. While tensions had been simmering for some time, this event represents a seismic shift and will require urgent firefighting from Pretoria.   

To be sure, maintaining good relations with the US is imperative for SA. Continued friction could catalyse severe financial market contagion, cripple bilateral trade (valued at about $20bn a year) and curtail investment into the country. While partners such as China and the EU have gestured in the direction of filling gaps left by the US, challenging domestic conditions across various partner states limit their capacity to fill this void. The truth is the relationship with the US is one SA can ill-afford to walk away from without significant economic and diplomatic ramifications.

Context is crucial. While relations have nosedived under US President Donald Trump, they were deteriorating well before that. Frustrations with SA were openly aired by the Joe Biden administration, which critiqued incidents such as the Lady R debacle, joint naval exercises with Russia and China, and SA’s stance towards Israel — as demonstrated by the ongoing case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). But unlike Biden, Trump will not treat SA with kid gloves. 

Moreover, the country is an easy target because it has little leverage. Within Brics, Moscow enjoys a deepening rapprochement with Washington, China is too economically powerful to be strong-armed, Brazil is critical to US trade, and India is a vital strategic partner. SA, by contrast, is an economically expendable player that can be used to set an example for others.

Worryingly, SA’s foreign policy machinery has failed to appreciate and adapt to this paradigm shift. Instead, it has doubled down on a quasi-ideological approach, predicated on principled but outdated norms, an opaque notion of progressive internationalism, and an overstatement of its bargaining power and moral leadership. Such an approach is a miscalculation in a Trump era where the US has essentially transformed from the underwriter to the undertaker of the global liberal order.

Trump has discarded any pretence of diplomacy rooted in norms and values, instead favouring raw transactionalism. For Washington, interests — not decorum or shared history — now govern foreign policy; goalposts are prone to shift depending on Trump’s inclination, sentiment among those in his orbit, and a policy of deliberate unpredictability. Playing by traditional diplomatic conventions in a world where realpolitik, brute force and dexterity dictate global affairs will not serve SA’s interests. The uninspiring response from Pretoria to Rasool’s expulsion signals a dangerous lack of awareness of this reality. 

So, what can Pretoria do in this context? First, it must acknowledge and adapt to the new rules of engagement. As Athenian general and historian Thucydides said: “The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” This is the current reality of international relations. Countries with far more leverage than SA have noted this change and are making the required shifts.

France and the UK provided masterclasses on ways to deal with the Trump administration. Both Emmanuel Macron and Keir Starmer have demonstrated how to engage assertively yet pragmatically, extracting concessions where possible, deploying flattery where needed, and avoiding unnecessary ideological conflicts. Admittedly, SA is not in the same basket as France and the UK. Regardless, it must shed any illusions about the utility of its rigid approach. 

Own goals

Second, SA must avoid diplomatic own goals. The Rasool debacle comes against a backdrop of disinformation by US interests, which warrants some frustration. However, recent weeks have seen a series of unnecessary missteps that have further strained relations with Washington. Rasool’s ill-judged comments, the ANC’s decision to host an Iranian delegation at its headquarters, petroleum & mineral resources minister Gwede Mantashe’s provocative remarks at the Mining Indaba alluding to a halt in trade of critical minerals, and the proposed renaming of Sandton Drive (the road where the US consulate in Johannesburg is located) to Leila Khaled Drive, have all drawn the ire of an already hawkish administration.

In avoiding own goals, two things are critical: message discipline and clearly defining red lines. Evident red lines include the ICJ case against Israel, which Pretoria sees as a matter of principle and national credibility, and the Expropriation Act, which is an issue of internal sovereignty and domestic priority. The current haphazard and clumsy communication from government officials is self-defeating. While President Cyril Ramaphosa has struck a measured and rational tone, members of his party and the cabinet have not, creating confusion and giving Washington further ammunition. A unified, consistent message is essential, with alignment between the president, cabinet and other nodes of government. 

Message discipline equally involves countering the influence of far-right and right-wing Afrikaner lobby groups in Washington, which are muddying perceptions of SA. Ethnonationalist organisations such as AfriForum have successfully garnered attention in Republican circles. Often, they have outpaced the government. The way in which SA’s policies of redress have been equated to diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) highlights the efficacy of their lobbying. Instead, SA should take advantage of Trump’s deal-making instincts, identifying areas where a mutually beneficial arrangement can be struck. 

Here, a deal with Starlink is low-hanging fruit. It will require a concession on SA’s employment equity requirements, but doing so might well offer wider economic and diplomatic returns. Pretoria can also leverage deep private sector ties that straddle multiple political interests in both countries. SA is home to more than 600 US subsidiaries, and those shared commercial interests provide Pretoria with an anchor for relations and auxiliary channels for shuttle diplomacy. With SA’s continued inclusion in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (Agoa) now unlikely, Pretoria would be well advised to get on the front foot and proactively propose an alternative bilateral trade deal with Washington. 

Another potential bargaining chip is the Simon’s Town naval base. The facility’s location near the southern tip of the continent has placed it at the centre of the geopolitical tussle between the US and China, with hawks in Trump’s orbit long eyeing its utility. Savvy diplomacy could see SA exploiting great powers to maximise commercial largesse while maintaining sovereignty through limited usage and lease agreements. 

Elsewhere, the war in Ukraine has demonstrated how quickly diplomatic hostility can shift into pragmatism when resources are at stake. SA supplies and exports 12 of the 15 critical minerals the US deems crucial for its economy. SA must therefore explore whether critical mineral deals could realign its position in US eyes, particularly those relevant to the technology, energy and defence sectors. This positive framing of incentives and identification of the quid pro quo may help shift the tone of the current discourse. 

Lastly, SA must be tactful in appointing a new ambassador to the US whose lineage and political history align with Trump’s zeitgeist but who can equally champion the SA government’s causes on everything from the ICJ case to its policies on land redistribution and racial redress. 

Pretoria does not need to cede sovereignty, but must avoid escalating tensions. If SA is seen to be capitulating entirely it will lose credibility and be treated like a vassal state. On the other hand, defiance without strategy will result in further diplomatic and economic isolation. 

• Gopaldas is director, and Ndhlovu lead analyst, at Signal Risk.